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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF U1'All;· · 
STATE OF UTAH and JOANN 
LORRAINE CLARK, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs-
MARK THOMAS CLARK I 
Defendant and Respondent. 
and 
__________ ,.. 
STATE OF UTAH and SHARON 0. BOWNE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
. -vs-
KIM p. BOWEN I 
Defendant and Respondent .• : 
OF UTAH and MARY 0. VI.IL, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
M. VIGIL, 
Defendant and 
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REHEARING DO NOT RISE TO THE STAN-
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SHOULD BE DENIED ......... . 
Point II. THE COURT'S DISTINCTION OF THE DIF-
FERENCE BETWEEN THE RIGHT OF ONE WHO 
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FUTURE SUPPORT OF HIS CHILDREN, SHOULD 
APPLY TO THE STATE UNDER THE UNIFORM 
CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT. 
CONCLUSION. 
CASES CITED 
BROWN V. PICKARD 4 U. 292, 11 P. 512. . 
DREDGE CORP. v. HUSITE CO. 369 P.2d 676 • 
IN Re McKNIGHT 4 U. 237, 9 P. 299. 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated 78-45-9 . . .. 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
2 
3 
5 
2 
3 
2 
4 
Utah Rule Civil Procedure 76(e) (1) ...•.•• · • . • • • • 2 
i 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN TilE SU?KE1·1E COUR'l' OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
sT;i!E OF UTAH and JOi\cJ)J 
LORRiUNE CLARK, 
-vs-
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Hi\RK THOHI\S CLi\RK, 
Defendant and Resrcndent 
and 
STATE OF UTAH and SHli.RON 0. BOl-lEN, : 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs-
Kll1 P. BO\•iEN, 
Defendant and Respondent 
STATR OF UTAH and MARY 0. VIGIL, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
-vs-
ALFWSO M. VIGIL, 
Defendant and Respondent 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
CIVIL NOS. 
14132, 14133, 14134 
STATEI•lENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants agree substantially with Respondent's state-
of the nature of the case. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOi'lER COURT 
A ppellants agree substantially with Respondents' 
statement of the disposition. 
·RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek a denial of respondents' Petition 
for P..ehearing and to affirm the Court's · prior decision. 
STATEHENT OF FACTS 
Appellants agree substantially \vith Respondents state-
ment of Facts. 
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ARGUHI:NT 
POIUT I 
RESPONDENTS' PETITIOll Ai\D BRIEF FOR REHEARING DO NOT 
RISE TO THI: STAI.JDARD SET BY THIS COURT AND THEREFORE SHOULD 
BE DENIED. 
Ut2l1 Rule of Civil Procedure 76 (e) (1), Petition for 
Rehearing, states in part: 
"(1) Within 20 days after the filing of the 
decision of the Supreme Court, either party may 
petition the court for a rehearing. The petition 
shall state briefly the points wherein it is al-
leged that the appellate court has erred. The 
petit'. 'Jn shall be supported by a brief of the authori- ! 
ties r-P-lied upon to sustain the points listed in such , 
petition." 
Respondents' petition for rehearing lists only one poin:l 
where this court erred, and that error, in essence, was the I 
holding. Further, counsel for petitioners merely reargues 
basic issues of the case which this court fully considered 
appeal. 
This court, long ago, stated that to justify a 
"a strong case must be made." In re McKnight, 4 U. 237, 9 
299, Brown v. Pickard, 4 U. 292, 11 P. 512. 
Brown, supra, is most instructive and might well have 
written regarding respondents' petition for rehearing: 
"The appellant moves for a rehearing. He al-
leges that ... the court erred in its conclusions. 
Nothing is now submitted as a reason why a rehear-
ing should be granted that was not fully considered 
in the argument. No showing is made that satisfies 
the court that it should review its conclusions, 
and \ve are not convinced that we erred. We long 
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ago laid down the rule that, to justify a 
reh~~arlng, L~ s::rong cas2 r.. 1.lSt be made. \Ve must 
be convinced that the court failed to consider 
some material point ln the cas2, or that it 
erred in its conclusions, or that some m~tter 
has been discovered which was unk••own at the 
time of hear1ng. Venard v. Old Hi~kory M & s. 
Co., 7 Pac. Rep. 408. h'here a case has been 
fUlly and fairly considered in all 1ts bear-
ings, a rehearing will be denied. People v. 
Rogerson, 7 Pac. Rep. 410. (Emphasis added) 
Nowhere does counsel for petitioners, in his brief for 
rehearing, argue that the court failed to consider some mater-
ial point or that some matter has been discovered v;hich was 
unknown at the time of the hearing. Rather, counsel merely 
maintains this court erred in its conclusions and reargues 
his original brief. 
The Supreme Court of Nevada, our sister state, has held 
that where the petition for rehearing is, in effect, a reargu-
ment of the petitioner's original brief, the petition should 
properly be denied. Dredge Corp. v. Husite Co., 369 P.2d 676. 
Appellants respectfully submit the same law should apply in 
Utah. 
Surely, in light of the history of this case, counsel 
for respondent cannot seriously argue that this case has not 
been "fully and fairly considered in all its bearings"; and 
therefore, in accordance with the rule of the case in ~' 
supra, the petition for rehearing should be denied. 
POINT II 
THE COURT'S DISTINCTION OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE 
RIGHT OF ONE WHO HAS FURNISHED SUPPORT TO A CHILD TO HAVE 
REIMBURSEt'!ENT, AS DISTINGUISHED FROH AN ADJUDICATION OF THE 
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ANOUNT A FATHER SHOuLD PAY FOR THE CURRENT AND FUTU:\2 SUPPORi 
OF EIS CHILDREN, SHOULD APPLY TO THE STATE UNDER THE UNIFOPJi 
CIVIL LIABILITY FOP SUPPORT ACT. 
i 
Counsel again relies on and cites the Restatement of the\ 
of Restitution-Quasi Contracts and Constructive Trusts, Chapt,l 
:; , Benefits Voluntarily Conferred, Section 113, page 464, in 
his supporting brief. This section and language was cited in 
Respondents' original appellate brief (at page 18). Since g;l 
case was originally, and still is, a matter of statutory inter-· 
pretation and construction, Respondents' reliance is ill-place· 
on the "normal rule for reimbursement of a person who has sut-
plied necessities to a third party," found in the Restatement,! 
supra. The Restatement does not apply where there is a statuti 
Thus, this language twice cited, and twice relied upon by Re· 
spondents,simply is not applicable to this case. 
In the interest of economy of time, appellants will mere! 
respond briefly to other particular arguments found in Responc 
ents' brief. 
At the bottom of page 2, Respondents stated that "the UC' 
\qas enacted for the sole purpose of obtaining support for neei 
obligees." This simply is not true. It was also enacted for 
the reimbursement of the state for funds expended when obligor 
fail to support their obligees. See U.C.A. 78-45-9. 
On page 3, Respondents make an untenable aroument to 
the effect that the state will not seek prospective support 
orders for a sum certain, because it can "make money" by 
waiting and seeking reimbursement later. Reality and experi · 
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teach us better. First, the state simply cannot recover 
100% of all money expended for obligees from 100% of all 
derelict obligors. Manpower, time and money does not allow 
it. Second, the state views the UCLSA as both a preventative 
and curative statute. We want to cure current support problems, 
and,more importantly, prevent, by means of future support orders 
and strict enforcement, future support problems. 
On page 5 of Respondents' brief, counsel points out that 
the State of Utah has a statutory duty to provide support to 
destitute mothers and children, and thereby argues by implica-
tion that the state should pay out welfare and stay out of the 
recovery business. Appellants submit that there would be no 
destitute mothers and children were it not for fathers who re-
fused to perform their legal, moral and statutory duty to sup-
port their families. The State of Utah fulfills its statutory 
duty and merely expects fathers in the state to do the same. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon appellant's brief, "'e respectfully urge this 
court to deny respondents' petition for rehearing, as they 
have not met their burden of showing wherein this court erred 
in its conclusion in its decision. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
FRANK V. NELSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
STEPHEN G. SCH\-JENDH1AN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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